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Abstract
We study economies where improving the quality of institutions – modeled as im-
proving contract enforcement – requires resources, but enables trade that raises output
by reducing the dispersion of marginal products of capital. We ﬁnd that in this type
of environment it is optimal to combine institutional building with endowment redistri-
bution, and that more ex-ante dispersion in marginal products increases the incentives
to invest in enforcement. In addition, we show that institutional investments lead over
time to a progressive reduction in inequality. Finally, the framework we describe en-
ables us to formalize the hypothesis formulated by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) that
the initial concentration of human and physical capital can explain the divergence of
diﬀerent countries’ institutional history.
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11 Introduction
A well-functioning legal and institutional environment is pivotal to achieve an eﬃcient allo-
cation of resources. As Rajan and Zingales (2003) put it, proper institutions allow economies
to “[unleash] the power of ﬁnancial markets to create wealth and spread opportunity.” Some-
what surprisingly then, ineﬀective institutions appear to be remarkably persistent in many
countries. What causes some countries to develop well-functioning institutions, while others,
even at similar stages of economic development, don’t?1 A large literature emphasizes polit-
ical forces as a determinant of institutional quality.2 The standard argument is summarized
by Rajan and Zingales (2003), who write that “[t]he economically powerful are concerned
about the institutions underpinning free markets because they treat people equally, making
power redundant.” In this paper, we adopt a completely diﬀerent approach and consider a
model where institutional choice is based on eﬃciency considerations alone.
Our model borrows the key features of standard models in the vast literature on the
interplay between inequality and growth.3 Speciﬁcally we study economies populated by
agents endowed with a production technology characterized by decreasing returns to scale,
and with diﬀerent amounts of productive resources. These features imply that there are
potential gains from trading capital. We assume however that trade is constrained by the
fact that enforcement is limited in the sense that agents can default on any promise to deliver
goods after production is complete.
We then introduce a technology that imposes a penalty on people who renege on their
obligations. The intensity of punishment rises with the quantity of capital invested in this
technology. As enforcement improves, agents can choose from a wider set of contracts, and
the dispersion of marginal products is reduced. However, larger investments in enforcement
leave less capital available for production.4
To study the resulting trade-oﬀ, we ﬁrst consider a planner that allocates capital to max-
imize aggregate output subject to enforcement constraints. Some agents must be willing to
give up some of their endowment to ﬁnance enforcement but, in return, they receive transfers
1Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) point out for instance that while economies in the Western Hemisphere
were at fairly similar levels of development as recently as two centuries ago, the United States and Canada
were much quicker to develop institutions conducive to trade than the rest of the continent.
2See for example Persson and Tabellini (1994), Acemoglu, et al. (2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2007) among many others.
3See Benabou (1996) and Aghion et al. (1999) for reviews of this literature.
4This part of our set-up closely follows Koeppl (2007) who studies enforcement choices in the context of
intertemporal risk sharing.
2after production has occurred. The optimal allocation reduces the dispersion of marginal
products by optimally combining endowment redistribution with investments in the enforce-
ment technology. We show that the resulting income distribution is a left-censored version of
the distribution that would prevail under autarky.
We implement the solution to the social planner problem as a competitive equilibrium of
an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. The investment in enforcement is now
ﬁnanced by fees that grant agents access to capital markets. Endowment-rich agents provide
the capital necessary for investing in enforcement, and eﬀectively subsidize endowment-poor
agents. Competitive trade then achieves an eﬃcient allocation of capital given the optimal
enforcement level, with the eﬀects of the subsidy and beneﬁts from trade being concentrated
at the bottom of the initial endowment redistribution. These beneﬁts are larger the more
unequally marginal products are initially distributed.5
We then describe the dynamics of enforcement assuming simple intergenerational link-
ages, and analyze the interplay between institutional investments and the evolution of en-
dowment and income inequality. Over time, endowment and income inequality are reduced,
as endowment-poor agents gain the most from investing in enforcement. As inequality dimin-
ishes over time, so does the investment in enforcement.
Our results have important implications for the growing literature on the eﬀects of inequal-
ity on economic growth. That literature has produced a variety of models6 that predict that
when markets are incomplete, redistributing resources can foster growth. We ﬁnd that once
one treats market incompleteness as endogenous, the optimal policy in these environment
should comprise investments in institutions that improve the functioning of markets. In fact,
while the optimal solution also calls for some redistribution of endowments in our model, in-
stitutional investments make that redistribution possible in the ﬁrst place by allowing agents
who contribute to it to beneﬁt from trade.
Endogenizing market incompleteness also reveals that more ex-ante dispersion in marginal
products should lead to more institutional investments. At ﬁrst glance, this prediction appears
5In light of our implementation result, modeling enforcement as a technology can be interpreted in two
complementary ways. Enforcement allows one to set up a market environment for decentralized exchange
of capital. This includes the institutions necessary to enforce property rights and the obligations that arise
from trade. Alternatively, the technology can be seen as a redistributive tax system, where capital is re-
allocated before production and where taxes redistribute income after production. In both interpretations,
investment costs are incurred ex-ante to set up the necessary institutions. This includes not only setting up
and maintaining a legal framework, but also building the institutions necessary to enforce it.
6For a review, see Benabou (1997).
3to contradict the hypothesis formulated by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) that, at least in
the western hemisphere, nations with more equal distributions of human and physical capital
were ﬁrst to develop institutions conducive to credit and trade. We argue however that our
model, far from contradicting this hypothesis, provides additional support for it. Engerman
and Sokoloﬀ (2002) describe XIXth century Latin America as an area where both human and
physical capital were highly concentrated. North-America, however, had less inequality in
both capital, and developed better market-supporting institutions. When human and phys-
ical capital are complementary in production, a high concentration of productive resources
may result in little dispersion in marginal products. We show that a suﬃciently high posi-
tive correlation between human and physical capital endowment leads to small diﬀerences in
marginal products across people, hence to little incentives for investing in institutions con-
ducive to trade.7 What matters are the gains from building institutions rather than inequality
per se.8
This is particularly relevant for the ongoing debate on the relative importance of human
capital and institutional quality for economic development.9 Our ﬁndings suggest that the two
are intimately related and cannot be separated. Investment in human capital raises the returns
to investment in institutions. Conversely, better institutions enable nations to direct physical
resources to their most productive uses, which raises returns to human capital development.
Under those circumstances, the question of whether institution quality or human capital is
the key to development success may be immaterial, as it is the dynamic interaction between
the two that matters.
More generally, our paper suggests that in order to understand the relationship between
institutions, inequality and growth, one must not only look at the incentives for building
institutions, but also at where the gains from such institutions arise and how they can be
redistributed throughout the economy. We thus oﬀer a new approach that is free from assump-
tions on how political processes interact with economic eﬃciency, thus providing a compelling
benchmark that – if necessary – can be enriched by such considerations.
7See also Bernhardt and Lloyd-Ellis (2000) that point to general diﬀerences in marginal products rather
than inequality per se as the key to understand lack in growth performance.
8This exposes a complex relationship between measures of inequality and economic performance which
could account for why empirical studies struggle to establish robust results for this relationship. See for
example Benabou (1996) or, more recently, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003).
9See for example Glaeser et al. (2004) or Galor and Moav (2006).
42 The Environment
We study an economy where short-lived generations decide how much to invest in an enforce-
ment technology. Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {0,1,...}. The economy is populated
by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived families indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. At time t ≥ 0, a single mem-
ber of each family i ∈ [0,1] is alive. This agent is endowed with a quantity at
i ≥ 0 of capital.
We will assume throughout this paper that the distribution of endowments is non-degenerate
in all periods, and that the endowment function is suﬃciently smooth on [0,1] to allow us to
invoke the maximum principle where needed.
Each period, all agents are endowed with a technology that transforms input k ≥ 0
of capital into quantity kα of the consumption good where α ∈ (0,1). We adopt this Cobb-
Douglas speciﬁcation of the production schedule for concreteness. Assuming a strictly concave
and increasing production function suﬃces, however, to derive our results. All agents seek to
maximize their end-of-period income.
Since the production function is strictly concave and the endowment distribution is non-
degenerate, agents have clear incentives to trade capital in this context. Speciﬁcally, agents
with low capital endowments would like to borrow some capital from other agents in exchange
for end-of-period payments. We assume, however, that enforcement is limited. Agents can
default on any transfer they owe at the end of the period,10 in which case they incur a a real
cost ηt > 0 denominated in consumption-equivalent units.11
We begin below by brieﬂy considering the case where the punishment level is exogenous.
Clearly however, raising the level of punishment (hence the degree to which contracts can be
enforced) is costly, and our main objective in this paper is to study the resulting trade-oﬀ. We
will endogenize the enforcement choice by assuming that establishing enforcement level η ≥ 0
in any given period induces a capital cost g(η) ≥ 0 that must be borne before production
begins. We will assume that g is strictly convex, strictly increasing and twice diﬀerentiable
on (0,+∞), and that g(0) = 0. We allow for the possibility that limηց0 g(η) > 0 to make
room for ﬁxed costs. Finally, we assume for simplicity that investments in enforcement fully
depreciate across periods.
10For simplicity, we will assume that agents are not liable for the actions of other members of their lineage.
11This formulation follows Sappington (1983) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) among others. One could
also assume that default costs rise with capital (or, equivalently, output) according to a schedule D(η,k) for
all η,k ≥ 0 as long as D is jointly concave in both of its arguments.
53 Enforcement and the Eﬃcient Allocation of Capital
In this section, we study the problem solved by a given generation. Since each generation
solves a static problem, we omit for now the dependence of variables on time. The next
section will deal with the possibility of dynamic linkages across generations.
3.1 Optimal Capital Allocation for a Given Enforcement Level
We consider ﬁrst the situation where η is exogenous and requires no cost, and where agents
behave competitively. This will serves as a benchmark for the rest of the analysis.
Agents can trade capital at the beginning of the period at a gross interest rate R > 0.
They behave competitively in that they take this rate as given. In equilibrium, this rate is





i + (ai − ki)R
subject to
(ki − ai)R ≤ η
The constraint states that agents can only write contracts such that making good on end-of-
period obligations is individually rational.
The solution to this problem is easy to describe. Given R > 0, there exists an asset
threshold past which agents are unconstrained. Below that threshold, capital use rises one-
for-one with the agent’s endowment. Furthermore, it is clear that when η is suﬃciently high,
no agent is constrained and markets are eﬀectively complete. On the other hand, when η = 0,
trade is impossible and all production must be self-ﬁnanced. The following result says that,
more generally, a higher enforcement level leads higher interest rates and higher aggregate
output.
Proposition 3.1. Given η, a unique competitive equilibrium exists. Furthermore, aggregate
output and the equilibrium interest rate R rise with enforcement level η.
Proof. The aggregate supply of capital is
 
aidi, independently of both η and of R. Given η,
increases in R lower capital use because this makes capital more costly and makes borrowing
12The model then becomes a simpliﬁed version of the set up studied by much of the literature on inequality
and growth. See for example Aghion (1998) and Benabou (1996).
6constraints tighter. Therefore, the demand schedule is monotonically declining in R, and
equilibria are unique.
For the second part of the proposition, ﬁx η and let R(η) be the corresponding equilibrium












(ki − ai)R(η) ≤ η for almost all i.
Therefore, the desired result follows provided
η
R(η) rises with η.




R(η′). Then all agents are more
borrowing constrained and capital becomes more expensive. Hence, capital demand falls for
all agents. But that contradicts the fact that both R(η) and R(η′) are equilibrium rates, since
aggregate capital supply is the same in both cases.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this result. Given enforcement level η and the implied equilibrium
interest rate R(η), there is a unique optimal scale k(η) of production. Agents with endowment
past asset threshold a(η) ≡ k(η) −
η
R(η) are unconstrained, while other agents operate with a
capital stock equal to ki = ai +
η
R(η). Equilibrium capital input, therefore, rises one-for-one
with initial endowment until agents become unconstrained.
When enforcement increases from η to η′, borrowing constraints are relaxed and the de-
mand for capital shifts up at all rental rates. As the total supply of capital is ﬁxed, it must
be the case that the equilibrium interest rate R increases. A higher equilibrium interest rate
causes the optimal scale of production for unconstrained agents to fall. Because (once again)
the total supply of capital is ﬁxed, the two schedules must cross and it must therefore be the
case that η′/R(η′) > η/R(η). As a result, the dispersion in marginal products declines and
output, correspondingly, rises.
The relationship between the dispersion in marginal products and the enforcement level
η is the centerpiece of our analysis. Improvements in enforcement raise output much in the
way a policy of redistributing initial capital would do in this framework: both make marginal










Figure 1: Optimal capital allocation (η exogenous; no cost)
inequality in wealth – i.e., the initial capital endowment – increases, borrowing constraints
become more binding. In equilibrium, there is more dispersion in marginal products across
agents and, therefore, less output.
3.2 The Optimal Level of Enforcement
The foregoing analysis suggests that economies where endowments are unevenly distributed
have an incentive to establish institutions that make possible a reduction in the dispersion of
marginal products. In practice, however, these institutions are costly to provide. A trade-oﬀ
thus arises between using resources for costly institutions or producing output.
We consider ﬁrst a planner whose objective is to maximize aggregate output. This focuses
the analysis on pure eﬃciency considerations since such a planner has no direct interest in
reducing inequality. In addition, we prove in the appendix that this entails little loss of
generality. Assuming that the planner maximizes a strictly concave welfare functional over
agent’s end-of-period income does not change the nature of the optimal allocation. The
inclusion of ex-ante participation and ex-post enforcement constraints implies that there is
no room for redistributing income at the end of the period once eﬃciency considerations have
8been taken into account.
Given a distribution of endowment, the planner proposes a capital allocation k = {ki ≥
0|i ∈ [0,1]}, a schedule of post-production transfers t = {ti ∈ R|i ∈ [0,1]}, and a degree η ≥ 0
of enforcement. The planner’s proposal is restricted in two ways. First, agents can choose
to stay in autarky rather than participate in the proposed arrangement. Second, agents can
decide to default on the post-production transfer stipulated by the planner in which case they
incur punishment η.














i − ti ≥ a
α
i for almost all i (3.2)
ti ≤ η for almost all i (3.3)  
tidi ≥ 0. (3.4)
The ﬁrst constraint is a resource feasibility constraint. The second set of constraints
stipulates that agents have to be willing to participate in the proposed arrangement given that
they can always opt for autarky. The third set of conditions expresses the fact that transfer
enforcement is limited. The ﬁnal constraint expresses the fact that the planner cannot invent
resources at the end of the period. Setting transfers to zero implies that maximizing output
(or income before transfers) is equivalent to maximizing average consumption or total income
after transfers.
Our ﬁrst result states that because raising the enforcement level is costly, the planner
never chooses to eliminate all inequality in marginal products.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal allocation with endogenous enforcement is such that ki is not
almost everywhere equal.
Proof. Denote the multipliers associated with the constraints (3.1) - (3.4) by θ, {λi|i ∈ [0,1]},
{µi|i ∈ [0,1]} and τ, respectively. If the planner chooses not to invest in enforcement (η = 0),
then ki = ai almost everywhere and the result holds trivially. Assume then that η > 0.




µidi = 0 (3.5)
αk
α−1
i (1 + λi) − θ = 0 for almost all i (3.6)
−λi − µi + τ = 0 for almost all i. (3.7)
Also note that, together with the usual slackness conditions, these conditions are suﬃcient.
Assume now by way of contradiction, that ki is constant a.e. Then, λi is constant a.e.
as well by condition (3.6), as is µi by condition (3.7). But since η > 0, resource feasibility
requires that ai > ki for a non-negligible set of i. This implies that ti < η and µi = 0 for
that set. Hence, we need µi = 0 for almost all i, which cannot be the case by condition (3.5),
given that η > 0 and that, by (3.6), θ > 0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When capital use is equated across agents,
marginal products are equated as well. It follows that small deviations from such an allocation
have a negligible impact on output. On the other hand, reducing enforcement has a ﬁrst-order
eﬀect on the resources available for production.
We now turn to establishing that a unique solution to the planner’s problem exists and to
characterizing this optimal allocation.
Proposition 3.3. Generically, a unique solution to the social planner’s problem exists. Fur-
thermore, the optimal allocation is characterized by two endowment thresholds 0 ≤ a ≤ ¯ a and
two bounds 0 ≤ k ≤ ¯ k on capital use that determine the optimal capital allocation for almost









α if ai ∈ [a,¯ a]
¯ k if ai ≥ ¯ a.
End-of-period income is given by
k
α
i − ti =
 
aα if ai ≤ a
aα
i if ai ≥ a.
13See Cesari (1983). Our set of constraints satisﬁes a standard constraint qualiﬁcation.
10Proof. In order to apply Filippov’s existence theorem,14 we need to restrict transfers and
capital choices to a compact set. To do so, one can impose arbitrary bounds on both objects
that are large enough not to bind at any solution. This ensures existence.
To establish generic uniqueness, note that given the ﬁxed cost associated with implement-
ing the enforcement technology, we need to compare the value of the problem when η = 0 –
i.e., the value of the problem at autarky – and the value of the problem when the planner
chooses to bear the ﬁxed enforcement cost limηց0 g(η).
This second problem corresponds to solving the problem assuming that g(0) = limηց0 g(η).
We will argue that the solution under that assumption is unique, so that the only case in
which multiple solutions exist is when that solution happens to give exactly the same value
as autarky. Generically therefore, there is at most one solution.
Under the assumption that g(0) = limηց0 g(η), the planner’s choice set is convex in
(η,k,t). Since the planner’s objective function is strictly concave in k, there is at most one
optimal capital allocation in that case. The resource constraint then implies that η must
be unique as well. The transfer scheme is also unique because, as we argue below, either
the participation or the enforcement constraint must bind for all agents. If the enforcement
constraint binds, we have ti = η. If the participation constraint of the agent is binding,
transfers are given by ti = kα
i − aα
i .
We now turn to describing the optimal solution. As η = 0 implies autarky in which case
our characterization holds trivially, we assume that the optimal solution has η > 0. Conditions
(3.5)-(3.7) together with the associated slackness conditions describe the optimal solution. We
ﬁrst establish that for almost all agents, either the participation or the enforcement constraint
holds with equality. Assume to the contrary that for some non-negligible set of agents this
is not the case. Then, by condition (3.7), this is true for all agents. But this contradicts
condition (3.5) whenever η > 0 since θ > 0 by (3.6).
Consider next the set of agents with non-binding enforcement constraints (µi = 0). For






. On the other hand, agents





1−α < ¯ k. Finally, agents for







Figure 2: Optimal capital allocation (η endogenous; convex cost)
which both constraints bind employ
ki =
 








α ∈ [k,¯ k]
There only remains to be shown that these three groups of agents are separated by certain
asset thresholds. If agent i ∈ [0,1] is in the group with non-binding enforcement constraints,
¯ kα −aα
i < η. Similarly, being in the group with non-binding participation constraints implies
k
α−aα
i > η. Finally, a necessary condition for being in the group where both constraints bind
is given by kα
i −aα
i = η for some ki ∈ [k,¯ k]. These three conditions are mutually exclusive and
deﬁne the asset thresholds we need. The ﬁnal part of the proposition now follows from the fact
that all agents except those in the bottom group have a binding participation constraint.
Figure 3.2 shows the shape of the optimal capital allocation. Agents with low assets have
a binding enforcement constraint, but strictly prefer to participate in the optimal arrange-
ment. They all employ the same level k of capital which is the maximum level compatible
with enforcement level η. Conversely, agents with high asset endowments have a binding par-
ticipation constraint but a loose enforcement constraint. These agents operate at the highest
12level of capital ¯ k. Agents in the middle have both constraints binding and operate with the
capital stock such that their income level kα
i − η exactly matches their autarky income.
The result implies that the optimal arrangement can be described by three equations that
pin down the optimal level of enforcement η and the optimal allocation of capital as described





















i − ¯ a
α)di. (3.10)
The ﬁrst condition equates the marginal costs and the marginal beneﬁts of enforcement.
The right-hand side expresses the wedge between the marginal products of capital in the
optimal allocation. Interestingly, this corresponds to the diﬀerence between the inverse of
the marginal product of capital of unconstrained and constrained agents.15 The other two
equations describe the feasibility of allocating capital and of transfers.
The ﬁnal part of proposition implies that the optimal allocation leads to a more equal
income distribution than under autarky. In particular, all agents above the initial endowment
threshold a receive their autarkic income, while all other agents receive a ﬁxed income higher
than autarky. Hence, in this model, institutions that enable enforcement beneﬁt primarily
agents at the lower end of the wealth distribution.
Corollary 3.4. The optimal income distribution is a left-censored version of the income
distribution under autarky.
Proof. Agent i’s end-of-period income is kα
i − ti for all i ∈ [0,1]. All agents whose assets
exceed a have a binding participation constraint. Hence, they have the same income as under
autarky. Agents with endowments under a all realize income k
α − η = aα.
It is instructive to compare the optimal allocation when enforcement is endogenous to the
allocation that prevails when enforcement is costless and exogenous. In both cases, positive
enforcement reduces the dispersion of marginal products vis-a-vis autarky by making capital
15This is reminiscent of an inverse Euler equation describing eﬃciency in the literature on Mirleesian
taxation in dynamic economies. See e.g. Rogerson (1985) or Kocherlakota (2005).
13use constant past a certain asset threshold. The optimal allocation with an endogenous en-
forcement choice, however, also equates capital use among agents with low endowments. This
suggests that the planner combines investment in enforcement institutions with some degree
of redistribution of endowments when covering the costs of this investment. To make this
idea precise, we now explain how the optimal allocation can be implemented with competitive
capital markets.
3.3 Implementing the Optimal Allocation
When implementing the optimal allocation, it is necessary ﬁrst of all to ﬁnance the intro-
duction of enforcement at the optimal level η. We denote agent i’s contribution to set up
enforcement by κi. One could think of this as an entry fee (or subsidy when κi < 0) paid
from the initial endowment for participation in capital rental markets. After paying their
fees, agents enter capital markets with endowments equal to ˆ ai = ai − κi and trade capital
trade capital at a competitively determined rate R subject to a borrowing constraint given
by
(ki − ˆ ai)R ≤ η. (3.11)
The following results shows how the optimal allocation can be implemented via competitive
markets.
Proposition 3.5. Let (η,k,t) be the optimal allocation. Deﬁne R = α¯ kα−1 and let κi =
ai − (ki −
ti
R) for all i. Given the fee schedule {κi|i ∈ [0,1]}, competitive markets implement
the optimal solution with the equilibrium interest rate given by R.
Proof. Let ˆ ai = ai − κi for all i so that the total supply of capital available for production is
 













tidi = 0 at the planner’s solution. Note that this also implies that the fee schedule κi
covers the cost g(η).
We only have to verify that agent i chooses the optimal capital input, ki, at interest
rate R. If agents are unconstrained, they will choose a capital level such that the marginal
product is equal to R. Constrained agents, however, will choose a capital level that satisﬁes
the constraint (3.11).
14Consider an agent with ai > ¯ a who, therefore, is unconstrained in the optimal allocation.
Then, ti < η, and, by the deﬁnition of κi, the agent chooses ¯ k given R, as needed.
Agents with ai ≤ ¯ k are constrained in the optimal allocation so that ti = η. By the
deﬁnition of κi, this implies that ˆ ai = ki −
η
R. Hence, the agent chooses at most ki < ¯ k given
his borrowing constraint (3.11), as needed. This completes the proof.
One can interpret κi as a tax schedule to ﬁnance the establishment of a capital market. As
κ increases with an agent’s initial endowment, agents with high initial endowments ﬁnance a
high share of the institutional cost. Moreover, for low enough initial endowment, we have that
κ < 0 so that poor agents receive a subsidy before markets open. Hence, as we surmised in the
previous section, it is optimal to partially redistribute endowments before production begins.
This redistribution allows the market to achieve a better allocation of capital. Participation
constraints, however, impose an endogenous limit on how much endowment-rich agents can
be taxed and, thus, on redistribution.
Even though the fee schedule is monotonic in initial wealth, the ﬁnal result of this section
establishes that it is not uniformally progressive.
Corollary 3.6. The fee schedule κi is regressive for all ai ∈ [a,¯ a] and progressive otherwise.


















if ai ∈ [a,¯ a]
1 − 1
ai
 ¯ k −





if ai ≥ ¯ a.
For ai < a we then have
∂κi/ai
∂ai
= (k − η/R)/a
2
i > ai > 0.




















































i − ¯ k
α 
> 0.
4 Inequality and Institutions
In the one-input setting we have studied so far, more inequality in endowments implies a
greater ex-ante dispersion in marginal products. Hence, one would expect that economies
with more inequality should invest more resources in institutions providing enforcement, since
the associated beneﬁts are higher. To conﬁrm this idea, we model rising inequality as follows.
Let a∗ denote the average endowment. We say that the endowment schedule ˆ a = a+δ(a−a∗)
is more unequal than the distribution a when δ > 0.
For our static problem, we now present three results – successively, more general – es-
tablishing that a more unequal schedule of endowment leads to a higher enforcement level.
In this sense, economies with a greater dispersion in endowments and, hence, in marginal
products before trade, are more likely to invest in institutions providing enforcement. We
ﬁrst look at the case where there are only two agents with diﬀerent endowments.16
Proposition 4.1. Assume that there are two agents in all periods. When the distribution of
endowments becomes more unequal, the optimal level of enforcement η increases.
Proof. Write initial endowments in this case as (a − δ,a + δ) where a > 0 and δ ∈ [0,a). We
denote the production function as f and its inverse as h. Since f is concave, h is convex. We
also denote capital use by the endowment poor agents by k1, while k2 denotes capital use by
the rich agent.
Suppose the enforcement level is given by η > 0. Then the capital allocation must solve
k2 = h(f(a) − η)
16It is straightforward to adapt the analysis of the previous section to this case.
16where k2 ≤ 2a. The agent with the low endowment then operates with capital k1 = 2a −
h(f(a) − η) − g(η). Hence, total output is given by
Φ(η,δ) ≡ f(a + δ) − η + f (2a − h(f(a) − η) − g(η)).
Note that the function Φ is strictly concave in η. The envelope theorem then implies that






Diﬀerentiating the function Φ with respect to η we obtain
Φ1(η(δ),δ) = −1 + f
′(k1)(h
′(f(a + δ) − η) − g
′(η))
where k1 = 2a − h(f(a + δ) − η) − g(η) is the capital allocated to the low endowment agent.









since h is convex and f is strictly increasing and concave. Furthermore, both h and h′ are
increasing in δ, as f increases with δ. This implies that k1 decreases in δ and concavity of f
implies that f′(k1) rises with δ too. Thus we obtain that
Φ12(η(δ),δ) > 0
which completes the proof.
Returning to the case with a continuum of agents, suppose that the planner chooses to
invest in strictly positive enforcement for a given the distribution of endowments. We now
show that this remains the case if the distribution of endowments becomes more unequal.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the planner opts for strictly positive enforcement for a given
endowment distribution. This remains true when the endowment distribution becomes more
unequal.
Proof. Let k be the optimal capital allocation in the ﬁrst economy while η > 0 is the chosen







17Consider now the more unequal distribution of endowments described by ˆ ai = ai +δ(ai −
a∗). We will show that holding η ﬁxed a feasible capital allocation ˆ k exists in the more unequal
economy such that




i di. Hence, strictly positive enforcement remains optimal for
a more unequal distribution of endowments.










where it is assumed that δ is small enough that ˆ ki ≥ 0 for all i. This is without loss of
generality as the argument we use below is local. Leaving transfers unchanged, participation





















We are left to show that the new allocation satisﬁes the resource constraint. First, note
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Hence, evaluating this expression at δ = 0 shows that small changes to δ do not increase the
total capital employed provided












decreases as i rises. Hence, by Chebyshev’s integral inequality, we have














which completes the proof.
Finally, we now shows that the optimal level of enforcement rises with endowment in-
18equality in the speciﬁc case where the endowment distribution is symmetric around its mean.
We relegate the proof to the appendix.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that the endowment distribution is symmetric around its mean. If
the endowment distribution becomes more unequal, then the planner opts for no less enforce-
ment.
We argue in the proof that if an increase in inequality led the planner to decrease the level
of enforcement, it would be possible to construct an allocation that satisﬁes all constraints
with the original distribution of endowments, but raises output, thereby contradicting the
fact that the original allocation was optimal.
5 The Dynamics of Enforcement, Wealth and Inequal-
ity
In the previous sections, we abstracted from any dynamic linkages. In this section, we focus
on the interaction over time between wealth inequality and enforcement. In particular, we
are interested in the long-run evolution of institutions providing enforcement and its impact
on diﬀerences in wealth among agents over time. In order to keep the analysis tractable, we
restrict our attention to simple inter-generational linkages.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that every period a member of lineage i ∈ [0,1] agent of family
i ∈ [0,1] inherits as endowment a given fraction γi ∈ [0,1] of their parent’s income, where γi
is strictly increasing in i. We also maintain the assumption that investments in enforcement
fully depreciate across periods.
Positing exogenously given intergenerational linkages is standard in most of the existing
literature on inequality, growth and missing markets.17 There are at least two interpretations
for such transfers: “warm-glow” altruism in the sense of Andreoni (1989), and intergener-
ational spillovers. The second interpretation is best understood if one thinks of productive
resources in part as human capital. It has the advantage of side-stepping an obvious weakness
of the warm-glow interpretation, namely the fact that lineages fail to internalize the conse-
quences of their transfers on the welfare of their oﬀspring. That concern is particularly strong
in environments with redistribution policies. We thus emphasize the spillover interpretation
and assume that generations are not linked in any other way. In particular, we will assume
17See for example Aghion and Bolton (1996), Banerjee and Newman (1993) or Benabou (1996).
19that generations are myopic about the dynamic eﬀects of introducing institutions in the sense
that they do not take into account the eﬀect of the current enforcement choice on future
generations’ welfare.
If there is no enforcement technology, the only feasible allocation of capital is autarky
in all periods. It follows directly that in that case the endowment of members of lineage i
converges geometrically to γ
1
1−α
i over time. Hence, the endowment distribution converges to
the corresponding invariant distribution.18 We assume for simplicity that in period 0, the
distribution of endowments is this invariant distribution.
Suppose now that the possibility of investing in enforcement at a cost schedule given by g
is introduced. If the ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently large, no investment in enforcement is ever made,
and the economy remains forever at the initial invariant distribution. To focus on the more
interesting case, assume that the invariant distribution is suﬃciently unequal that it is optimal
to bear the ﬁxed cost in period 0. The next result states that under that assumption, bearing
the ﬁxed cost remains optimal in all subsequent periods, and that introducing enforcement
leads to a progressive reduction of endowment inequality.
Proposition 5.1. If it is optimal to invest in enforcement at date t = 0, then the optimal
allocation features a positive enforcement level for all periods t ≥ 0 that decreases over time.
Furthermore, the economy converges monotonically to a long-run invariant distribution of
income and endowments with progressively less inequality and higher output.
Proof. Denote the optimal enforcement level in period 0 by η0 > 0 and let at be the endowment
function at date t. Recall that our assumptions on g imply that it is never optimal to fully
equate marginal products of capital. We ﬁrst show that in period 1, the optimal positive level
of enforcement in the previous period η0 yields higher output than autarky (η = 0). Hence,
enforcement will be at a strictly positive level. We then show that the new optimal level
of enforcement in period 1 is strictly lower than the one in period 0, or, equivalently, that
η1 ∈ (0,η0). The desired result on the dynamics of enforcement will then follow by induction.
The optimal allocation at t = 0 is described by equations (3.8)-(3.10). There are two
cut-oﬀ points a0 = γ
1
1−α
0 and ¯ a0 = ¯ γ
1
1−α
0 determining capital and transfers given the optimal
18Note that the endowment distribution converges at a geometric rate to a single mass point if lineages be-
queath the same fraction of their income regardless of whether institutional investments are made. Eventually
then, output is at its maximum independently of the economy’s history of institutional choices.














i if γi ≥ γ
0.







i whenever γi < γ
0, we have that E(a1) > E(a0).
Suppose ﬁrst that we constrain the choice of enforcement to the level η0 in period 1. It is
straightforward to verify that the optimal allocation of capital is still described by equations
(3.9) and (3.10). In particular, the new upper endowment threshold ¯ a1(η0) is the same as in
period 0, while the lower threshold a1(η0) has to increase from its period 0 value, since the
aggregate endowment has gone up (E(a1) > E(a0)). These new thresholds pin down the new
optimal allocation conditional on keeping the enforcement level at η0.
We will now argue that this candidate allocation yields an average income level that
exceeds its autarky counterpart at endowment distribution a1, so that, in particular, it remains
optimal to invest in positive enforcement in period 1. First note that the optimal allocation
of capital {k0
i : i ∈ [0,1]} in period 0 is still feasible in period 1 given enforcement level η0.






i so the value of autarky is the same in



















as γi < γ
0. This implies directly that in period 1 income is higher for everyone at the optimal
period 0 allocation than it would be under autarky. As transfers sum to zero, aggregate
output is also higher with enforcement than with autarky. Hence, it remains optimal to
invest enforcement in period 1.
Next, we show that η1 < η0. Evaluating the ﬁrst-order condition (3.8) at the optimal














or, in other words, that the marginal cost of enforcement exceeds the marginal beneﬁts of
enforcement at η0 for the new aggregate endowment E(a1) in period 1. Note that the right-
hand side of this equation describes the marginal beneﬁts – denoted by the function f1(η) –
21of a given level of η for the optimal allocation of capital associated with that level in period
1.
From the concavity of the objective function and the strict convexity of the constraint
set – which is ensured by our assumptions on g conditional on incurring the ﬁxed cost – we
have a unique optimal value of enforcement η1 that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (3.8).
Furthermore, for η → 0 marginal beneﬁts exceed marginal costs and for η → ∞ the opposite
is true. Hence, from the inequality above, it follows directly that the new optimal level of
enforcement in period 1 decreases (η1 < η0) and that for all η ∈ (η1,η0]
g
′(η) > f1(η).
To complete the proof, we show that lowering η in period 1 to its new optimal level implies
that the optimal cut-oﬀ points in period 1, a1 and ¯ a1, both increase relative to their period
0 values. To do so, we look at how the optimal capital allocation conditional on a given level
of η changes in period 1 with changes in the enforcement level itself. Totally diﬀerentiating





α¯ aα−1 (1 − F(a))
< 0.
Since the upper tail of the endowment distribution in period 0 is identical to the one in period
1, this implies that ¯ a1 > ¯ a0. Next, totally diﬀerentiating equation (3.9) and using the result









where f1(η) is deﬁned above. Thus as long as g′(η) > f1(η), decreasing η increases the cut-oﬀ
point. But we have established above that this is indeed the case for all η ∈ (η1,η0]. Hence,
a1 > a0.
We have then shown that the sequence of endowment distributions is a monotonically
increasing sequence of distribution functions on [0,1]. Furthermore, we can bound the values
of each distribution of the sequence below by 0 and above by γ
1
1−α
max. It then follows that the
sequence of endowment distributions converges to some distribution as t → ∞. Along this
sequence, we have successively less inequality and higher output as marginal products become
more equal. This completes the proof.
We have not addressed here the interaction between enforcement choice and growth rates
22where the latter depends endogenously on the evolution of productivity over time. When
aggregate productivity growth from one period to the next depends on current aggregate
output, choosing better institutions should have a permanent, positive eﬀect on growth. To
see why, assume as in Aghion et al. (1999) that agents in period t can transform capital k
into output according to Atkα where At > 0 measures aggregate productivity. The evolution







for all t > 0, where ki,t denotes the capital with which agent i operates at date t and the initial
productivity level is normalized to A0 = 1. Assuming that agents’s individual endowments




i,t. Hence, the presence of institutions providing enforcement reduces
the dispersion in capital use and, thus, growth is then permanently higher once enforcement
becomes a choice variable.
6 The Engerman-Sokoloﬀ Hypothesis
As we have argued, our framework predicts that economies with more endowment inequality
should be quicker to invest in institutions conducive to trade, all else equal. This prediction
seems puzzling in light for instance of the historical evidence for the Western Hemisphere
surveyed by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002). This evidence suggests that human and physical
capital were more highly concentrated in Latin America than in the United States and Canada.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ surmise that a highly concentrated distribution of human and
physical capital could explain in part why the area was slow to implement institutions con-
ducive to trade. They motivate this hypothesis primarily on politico-economic grounds. In
this section we argue that the eﬃciency considerations we emphasize in this paper, far from
casting doubt on this hypothesis, provide additional support for it.
To see this, it is necessary to augment our basic static model to include heterogeneity in
both physical and human capital. Assume then that agents are born with a quantity ai > 0 of
physical capital and a level hi > 0 of human capital for all i ∈ [0,1] with the joint distribution
of human and physical capital described by µ. Agents are also endowed with a technology that
transfers physical capital into consumption goods according to a Cobb-Douglas production
23function h1−αkα, where h is the human capital of the agent and α ∈ (0,1). In other words,
agents with more human capital are more productive and human capital cannot be traded
across agents. Hence, the endowment of human capital acts like an agent-speciﬁc productivity
parameter that is ﬁxed.
For simplicity, we consider here only the case where the choice is between autarky and full
enforcement. Full enforcement can be implemented at a ﬁxed cost of C > 0 units of capital
before production starts. While we will not repeat the argument in this section, it is clear
that an optimal allocation with enforcement can once again be implemented via competitive
markets with a speciﬁc schedule of entry fees and subsidies. The fee schedule again has to
satisfy all agents’ participation constraint.
Since any transfer can be enforced when markets are complete, all participation constraints
can be met if and only if aggregate output increases after the enforcement cost C has been
incurred. If there is no investment in enforcement, default cannot be punished hence all










α) + COV (h
1−α,a
α). (6.1)
On the other hand, when the planner bears cost C, markets are complete and the planner
is able to equate marginal products across agents. Denoting the total endowment of human







Using aggregate resource feasibility, it follows then directly that full enforcement leads to

















Holding the endowment distribution of the other factor ﬁxed, a mean preserving spread in
either human capital or physical capital endowments lowers output under autarky without
aﬀecting the complete market outcome. Hence, as in the analysis with only physical capital,
more inequality can lead to more investment in institutions, as the beneﬁts from trade have
increased. However, in this two-dimensional setting, for any given marginal distribution of
physical and human capital, the correlation in the endowments of both factors of production
24also determines institutional investment. If endowment in human and physical capital is
suﬃciently positively correlated, aggregate output is higher under autarky and there is no
institutional investment. The following results formalizes these ideas.
Proposition 6.1. Introducing complete markets with full enforcement at cost C leads to





α) > COV (h
1−α,a
α). (6.4)
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In economies where both human and
physical capital are highly concentrated, the gains from introducing institutions are small, as
the marginal products of capital are not very unequally distributed. In fact, when h and are








so that the inequality in Proposition 6.1 can never be met.
This result underscores the fact that it is inequality in marginal products before trade that
matters for returns to institutional investments, not the overall endowment inequality per se.
In the case of the Western Hemisphere, the fact that both human and physical capital have
been highly concentrated historically in much of Latin America could explain why institutional
quality has lagged behind its counterpart in the United States or Canada. In environments
where physical and human capital endowments are highly correlated, institutions conducive
to trading physical resources may not have much eﬀect on output and growth, unless resource
poor individuals are able to acquire more human capital. We have abstracted here from
dynamic considerations in the form of investment into human (and physical) capital, but
future work on the long-run implications of such a theory will be interesting.
7 Limited Commitment and Redistribution
Market economies often employ systems of ex-post income redistribution.19 When analyzing
investment in institutions that enable market exchange of capital, we have assumed that the
planner levies a fee schedule to ﬁnance the cost of enforcement g, but does not redistribute
19One can argue that democracies tend to be positively correlated with market economies, but also with
formal tax systems that redistribute income based on market outcomes.
25income further ex-post. This implies that as long as the fee schedule satisﬁes the ex-ante par-
ticipation constraint of agents, they will pay the fee to ﬁnance the investment in enforcement.
The fee itself is set optimally to achieve eﬃciency.
Instead, we assume in this section that the planner has a preference for equalizing con-
sumption across agents and that he cannot commit ex-ante – when ﬁnancing the enforcement
technology – to speciﬁc transfers after production has taken place.20 We choose the same
set-up as in the previous section, but restrict endowments to physical capital. Again, there
is a discrete choice of introducing full enforcement for a ﬁxed cost C.
Let τ = {τi : i ∈ [0,1]} be the fee schedule that is used at the beginning of the period
(before production) to invest in enforcement, while t = {ti : i ∈ [0,1]} still denotes transfers




i = (ai − τi)
α (7.1)
for all i ∈ [0,1] once enforcement has been ﬁnanced. Note that the fee schedule τ is feasible
as long as  
τidi ≥ C. (7.2)
Finally, we call a fee schedule τ incentive compatible, if the ex-post income of all agents after
fees τ and transfers t is at least as high as the ex-ante income with autarky aα.
Once enforcement is introduced, it is eﬃcient to equate marginal products of capital
yielding aggregate output equal to yE = (E(a) − C)
α = ¯ kα. Given enforcement has been








tidi = 0 (7.3)
¯ k
α − ti ≥ ˆ a
α for almost all i. (7.4)
20This is then somewhat reminiscent of the approach taken by Acemoglu et al. (2007). It also adds an
element of political economy considerations to our approach. See also Rajan (2007) who shows that persistent
underdevelopment can be explained by the fact that rich people cannot necessarily reap the beneﬁts from
institutional investment.
21Note that the fees charged here will be diﬀerent from the schedule κi used in our previous implementation
result.
26The solution is given by a cut-oﬀ level ˆ a below which all agents are unconstrained and receive
the same consumption level ¯ kα − ¯ t that exceeds autarky taking into account τ.
However, this puts restrictions on the fee schedule. Agents that receive higher consumption
than the minimum level cannot be taxed upfront in order to ﬁnance enforcement. For any
τi > 0 we have that ˆ aα < aα, and agents are better oﬀ staying in autarky from the beginning,
if they have initial wealth above ˆ a. Furthermore, as the planner wants to equate consumption
ex-post, it is never optimal to subsidize agents with high initial endowment. In other words,
there exists a cut-oﬀ level of initial endowment a such that τi = 0 and ti < ¯ t whenever a ≥ a.
Thus, only agents that are unconstrained at the minimum ex-post consumption level can
be taxed in order to ﬁnance enforcement. Their initial endowment is limited at
 
{i|a≤a} adi.
This introduces an additional ﬁnancing restriction on the planner’s problem leading to the
following result.
Proposition 7.1. Suppose aggregate output with full enforcement at ﬁxed cost C exceeds
output with autarky. If the planner cannot commit to an ex-post transfer schedule t, the




where a is the maximum endowment level where agents receive the constant minimum level of
consumption with full enforcement.
This result is intriguing. As soon as the planner cannot commit anymore to a particular
transfer scheme ex-post, only agents at the lower end of the wealth distribution can be taxed
to ﬁnance institutions. Levying a tax on wealthy agents and promising to reimburse them
for this tax through transfers when capital is being exchanged is not credible. It is important
to note that this result does not depend on using the enforcement technology to extract
additional resources from agents after the institution has been set-up. It arrives purely from
the lack of a commitment to a particular transfer scheme that could reimburse agents for
their initial investment. Hence, economies with an extreme inequality of wealth tend to face
additional barriers to introduce institutions that enable higher output and growth. Agents
that have enough endowment to ﬁnance good institutions might not have an incentive to do
so as they cannot reap a return from investing. Introducing a time-consistency problem on
the planner sheds thus some light on the question why economies with high inequality can be
stuck with persistently bad institutions.
278 Concluding remarks
In much of the recent literature on inequality and growth, it is the combination of inequality
and market imperfections that potentially lead to an adverse outcome. This, as the literature
has emphasized, creates a potential rationale for redistribution. In this paper, we have pointed
out that as long as it is possible to invest in better functioning markets, the optimal policy
typically calls for a combination of redistribution and institution-building. In other words,
a natural prediction of recent models of inequality and growth is that economies with more
inequality should invest more resources in institutions conducive to trade, simply because
more ex-ante inequality raises the beneﬁts of trade.
However, here as wherever inequality is the object of interest, it is critical to recognize
that it is ex-ante inequality in marginal products that matters for returns to various policies,
not endowment inequality per se. We have shown in this paper that endowment inequality
may in fact be associated with very little inequality in marginal products, hence low returns
to institutional building.
In the case of the Western Hemisphere, the fact that both human and physical capital have
been highly concentrated historically in much of Latin America could explain why institutional
quality has lagged behind its counterpart in the United States or Canada. In environments
where physical and human capital endowments are highly correlated, institutions conducive
to trading physical resources may not have much eﬀect on growth rates unless resource-poor
individuals acquire more human capital.
Our results also have several implications for the ongoing debate on the relative importance
of human capital and institutional quality for economic development (see e.g. Glaeser et al.
(2004) or Galor and Moav (2006)). The results suggest that the two are intimately related.
Investments in human capital raise the returns to investments in institutions. Conversely,
better institutions enable nations to direct physical resources to their most productive use,
which raises returns to human capital development. Under those circumstances, the question
of whether institution quality or human capital is the key to development success may be
immaterial.
289 Appendix
9.1 Concave Objective Function
The objective of this ﬁrst appendix is to show that when the planner has maximizes a strictly
concave objective function, he chooses the same allocation of capital and consumption as he
would with a linear objective. Denoting the endowment distribution by F and the planner’s












α − t(a) ≥ a
α for all a (9.2)
t(a) ≤ η for all a (9.3)  
t(a)dF(a) ≥ 0. (9.4)













1(a)dF(a) = 0. (9.7)
where ν0 and ν1 are the Lagrange multipliers on the participation and enforcement constraints,
respectively. Note that in the context of this section, these multipliers are normalized by the
endowment density f.
It follows immediately that for any optimal allocation, the resource constraint and the non-
negativity constraint on transfers must bind. Hence, λ > 0 and µ > 0. Similarly, assuming
no ﬁxed costs and convexity for enforcement costs (i.e., g(0) = 0 and g′(0) = 0 to be precise),
we have that η > 0, whenever F(a) is not degenerate. Also, by equation (9.7) it must be the
case that the enforcement constraint binds for some positive mass of endowments.











The ﬁrst equation determines consumption, while the second determines the capital input.
Next, we distinguish between several cases that will be relevant for characterizing the optimal
allocation.
Case 1 – Slack enforcement constraint





which is the same for all a at which the enforcement constraint is slack. Note that the par-
ticipation constraint does not matter for this result. Note also that k is the maximum k that
will be allocated to any a, i.e. maxa k(a) = k.
Case 2 – Slack participation constraint, but binding enforcement constraint




α − η). (9.11)
The left-hand side is increasing in k, while the concavity of u implies that the right-hand side
is increasing in k. Hence, there can be at most one solution to this equation. We call it k.
Case 3 – Both constraints bind





Of course, k(a) ≤ k.
Claim: The enforcement and the participation constraint cannot both be slack.
Note ﬁrst the when both constraints are slack at endowment level a, capital is the highest
30at k, but consumption the lowest. The ﬁrst follows from Case 1 above. As for the second,
suppose otherwise. Then, there exists some ˜ a < a where consumption is lower. But one can
then increase t(a) and decrease t(˜ a) a the same small amount to increase welfare, which is
feasible since the participation constraint is slack at a.
Now, suppose to the contrary that both constraints are slack. Since capital is at its highest
while consumption is at its lowest, it must be the case that transfer is at its highest as well.
But we have assumed that the enforcement is not binding, which implies that it is not binding
for any a, which is the desired contradiction.
Finally, let us determine the shape of k(a). For any a where enforcement constraint is
slack, we must have that k
α
− t = aα. Deﬁne a by k
α
− η = aα. Then from the claim above,
it must be the case that the enforcement constraint binds for all a ≤ a.
Now deﬁne a second cut-oﬀ point by k
α − η = aα. Clearly, a < a. Suppose now that for












which is a contradiction as both ˜ a < a and k(˜ a) < k(a).
Conclusion 1: For [0,a], only the enforcement constraint binds and capital is constant at k.
Next, for a > a > a the enforcement constraint binds. It follows that the participation
constraint must bind, as otherwise we have aα > k
α − η.
Conclusion 2: For [a,a], both constraints bind and capital is increasing according to the
function k(a) = (aα + η)
1
α.
Finally, suppose for some ˜ a > a, we have that the enforcement constraint binds. Then,
we have from the participation constraint that





implying that k(˜ a) > k which is a contradiction given the deﬁnition of k. Hence, the enforce-
ment constraint cannot bind which implies that the participation constraint has to bind.
Conclusion 3: For [a,∞), only the participation constraint is binding. Capital is constant
at k.
31Finally, we show that the two cut-oﬀ points and, hence, the optimal capital allocation
is identical to the problem where the planner maximizes output. Note ﬁrst, that there are
three regions as before that depend on which constraints bind. Second, the characterization
of the optimal capital allocation is given by three equations: (i) the ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to η, (ii) the feasibility constraint and (iii) the constraint that aggregate transfers
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0 = ηF(a) + k
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where k and k are deﬁned by η and the two cut-oﬀs in a. Obviously, the last two must be the
same as in the problem with output maximization. Also, the ﬁrst one (a ﬁrst-order condition)
does not depend on u and is identical to the ﬁrst-order condition for η in the other problem.
The consumption allocation also stays the same. In other words, when the planner maximizes
total output, he also achieves the highest level of redistribution that is feasible.
The intuition for this invariance result is simple. As the capital allocation remains un-
changed, agents below a receive the minimum consumption level given by k−η irrespective of
their initial endowment a. All the other agents obtain a consumption level that equals their
outside option aα.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Suppose the distribution of endowments is symmetric around the mean a∗, so that the full
enforcement eﬃcient level of capital is a∗ for all agents. Note that this assumption implies
a lower bound al and an upper bound ah on the distribution of endowment since we only
consider positive endowments. Consider a (small) mean preserving spread of the original




aidi = a∗. Let (ηδ,ˆ k,ˆ t) denote the solution to the planner’s problem for this
new distribution. Suppose that ηδ < η. We want to show that η, is then not optimal for




i − ti =
 
k
α − η if ai ≤ a(η)
aα
i if ai ≥ a(η)
We assume that δ is small enough that ˆ a(ηδ) > al and ¯ a(ηδ) < ah. Note that if the
planner implements η as a level of enforcement for the new distribution, then the threshold
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α − η if ai ≤ a′ (η)
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i if ai ≥ a′ (η)
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where the inequality follows from the fact that the planner chose enforcement level ηδ and not
33η (choosing η, we have to show that the threshold a′ (η) is feasible for the planner). Hence, for
all δ, a(ηδ) > a′ (η) = a(η)+δ (a(η) − a∗). Taking the limit as δ goes to zero, a(ηδ) ≥ a(η).
Therefore, a(ηδ) ≥ a(η), holds for all δ in some neighborhood O of zero. We now assume
that δ belongs to this neighborhood.
Since (ηδ,ˆ k,ˆ t) solve the planner’s problem, it must be the case that these two constraints
are satisﬁed (in particular for those agents i with endowments ai ∈ [al,ah])
ˆ k
α
i − ˆ ti ≥ a
α
i for almost all i,
ˆ ti ≤ ηδ for almost all i.
Also, the resource constraint implies, with a change of variable
  ah+δ(ah−a∗)
al+δ(al−a∗)













ˆ k (ai + δ(ai − a
∗))dF (ai) + g(ηδ) = a
∗.





and ηδ is feasible under the original distribution. For
any ai ∈ [al,ah], and the original distribution F (.) we use now the allocation given by
ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a∗)) and ηδ.
To check incentive compatibility we need to check that there is a function ˜ t(ai) such
that ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a∗))
α − ˜ t(ai) ≥ aα
i . Note that ˆ k (ai + δ(ai − a∗))
α − ˆ t(ai + δ(ai − a∗)) ≥
(ai + δ (ai − a∗))
α. However since ai + δ(ai − a∗) ⋚ ai for ai ⋚ a∗, ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a∗))
α −
ˆ t(ai + δ (ai − a∗)) ≥ aα
i may not be satisﬁed for ai < a∗. For all ai set ˜ t(ai) such that ˜ t(ai) =
min
 




. By construction, incentive compatibility is satisﬁed, and
there is a level ˆ a(ηδ) such that ˜ t(ai) = ηδ, for all ai < ˆ a(ηδ). We now need to check that
  ah
al ˜ ti (ai)dF (ai) ≥ 0. Note that ˆ a(ηδ) = a(ηδ). The reason is that by the deﬁnition of a(ηδ)
we have ˆ k(a)
α − ηδ = a(ηδ)
α for all a < a(ηδ)
α. Hence, since a(ηδ) + δ (a(ηδ) − a∗) < a(ηδ),
ˆ k (a(ηδ) + δ (a(ηδ) − a∗))
α − ηδ = a(ηδ)
α. This also holds for all a < a(ηδ). Also, for all
a > a(ηδ) such that a + δ(a − a∗) ≤ a(ηδ), we know that ˆ k (a(ηδ) + δ(a(ηδ) − a∗))
α − ηδ =
34a(ηδ)
α < aα. Therefore, ˆ a(ηδ) = a(ηδ). Thus,
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al



































ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a
∗))
























for δ close enough to zero using symmetry of the endowment distribution. So, the policy
(ηδ,ˆ k,˜ t) is feasible for the original distribution. Also we showed earlier in the proof that
a(ηδ) ≥ a(ηδ) for δ ∈ O. Therefore,
  ah
al
ˆ k(ai + δ(ai − a
∗))




ˆ k(ai + δ(ai − a
∗))
α − ˜ t(ai)dF (ai) +
ah  
a(ηδ)
ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a
∗))




ˆ k(ai + δ(ai − a
∗))








ˆ k(ai + δ(ai − a
∗))


























α − t(ai)]dF (ai)
and, since k(ai)
α − ti (ai) = aα







































































ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a
∗))








ˆ k (ai + δ (ai − a
∗))



































α − t(ai)]dF (ai) which competes the proof.
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